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Figure 1. Compassion and empathic distress. 
Schematic model that differentiates between two empathic reactions to the suffering of others. Empathy and 
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As humans we are a highly social 
species: in order to coordinate our 
joint actions and assure successful 
communication, we use language 
skills to explicitly convey information 
to each other, and social abilities 
such as empathy or perspective 
taking to infer another person’s 
emotions and mental state. The 
human cognitive capacity to draw 
inferences about other peoples’ 
beliefs, intentions and thoughts has 
been termed mentalizing, theory of 
mind or cognitive perspective taking. 
This capacity makes it possible, for 
instance, to understand that people 
may have views that differ from our 
own. Conversely, the capacity to 
share the feelings of others is called 
empathy. Empathy makes it possible 
to resonate with others’ positive and 
negative feelings alike — we can thus 
feel happy when we vicariously share 
the joy of others and we can share 
the experience of suffering when we 
empathize with someone in pain. 
Importantly, in empathy one feels with 
someone, but one does not confuse 
oneself with the other; that is, one still 
knows that the emotion one resonates 
with is the emotion of another. If this 
self–other distinction is not present, 
we speak of emotion contagion, a 
precursor of empathy that is already 
present in babies.
While shared happiness certainly 
is a very pleasant state, the sharing 
of suffering can at times be difficult, 
especially when the self–other 
distinction becomes blurred. Such 
a form of shared distress can be 
especially challenging for persons 
working in helping professions, such 
as doctors, therapists, and nurses. 
In order to prevent an excessive 
sharing of suffering that may turn 
into distress, one may respond to the 
suffering of others with compassion. 
In contrast to empathy, compassion 
does not mean sharing the suffering 
of the other: rather, it is characterized 
by feelings of warmth, concern and 
care for the other, as well as a strong 
motivation to improve the other’s 
wellbeing. Compassion is feeling for 
and not feeling with the other. Given the potentially very different outcomes 
that empathic or compassionate 
responses to others’ distress may 
have, it is of great importance to 
understand which factors determine 
the emergence of these different 
social emotions and to know more 
about whether and how such 
emotional responses can be trained 
and changed. 
Psychological perspective 
Although the concepts of empathy 
and compassion have existed for 
many centuries, their scientific 
study is relatively young. The term 
empathy has its origins in the Greek 
word ‘empatheia’ (passion), which is 
composed of ‘en’ (in) and ‘pathos’ 
(feeling). The term empathy was 
introduced into the English language 
following the German notion of 
‘Einfühlung’ (feeling into), which 
originally described resonance with 
works of art and only later was used 
to describe the resonance between 
human beings. The term compassion 
is derived from the Latin origins 
‘com’ (with/together) and ‘pati’ (to 
suffer); it was introduced into the 
English language through the French 
word compassion. In spite of the 
philosophical interest for empathy and 
the fundamental role that compassion 
plays in most religions and secular 
ethics, it was not until the late 20th 
century that researchers from social 
and developmental psychology 
started to study these phenomena 
scientifically.
According to this line of 
psychological research, an empathic 
response to suffering can result in 
two kinds of reactions: empathic distress, which is also referred to as 
personal distress; and compassion, 
which is also referred to as empathic 
concern or sympathy (Figure 1). For 
simplicity, we will refer to empathic 
distress and compassion when 
speaking about these two different 
families of emotions. While empathy 
refers to our general capacity to 
resonate with others’ emotional 
states irrespective of their valence — 
positive or negative — empathic 
distress refers to a strong aversive 
and self-oriented response to the 
suffering of others, accompanied 
by the desire to withdraw from a 
situation in order to protect oneself 
from excessive negative feelings. 
Compassion, on the other hand, is 
conceived as a feeling of concern 
for another person’s suffering 
which is accompanied by the 
motivation to help. By consequence, 
it is associated with approach and 
prosocial motivation. 
Research by Daniel Batson and 
Nancy Eisenberg in the fields of 
social and developmental psychology 
confirmed that people who feel 
compassion in a given situation help 
more often than people who suffer 
from empathic distress. Furthermore, 
Daniel Batsons’ work showed that 
the extent to which people feel 
compassion can, for instance, be 
increased by explicitly instructing 
participants to feel with the target 
person. Interestingly, the capacity to 
feel for another person is not only a 
property of a person or a situation, 
but can also be influenced by 
training. 
In order to train social emotions like 
compassion, recent psychological 
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Figure 2. Neural network underlying empathy for pain. 
Depicted functional neural activations on the right are the result of a meta-analysis based on 
nine fMRI studies investigating empathy for pain. AI, anterior insula; aMCC, anterior middle 
cingulate cortex; IFG, inferior frontal cortex. Right side of figure reproduced with permission 
from Lamm et al. (2011).research has increasingly made use 
of meditation-related techniques 
that foster feelings of benevolence 
and kindness. The most widely used 
technique is called ‘loving kindness 
training’. This form of mental practice 
is carried out in silence and relies on 
the cultivation of friendliness towards 
a series of imagined persons. One 
would usually start the practice by 
visualizing a person one feels very 
close to and then gradually extend 
the feeling of kindness towards 
others, including strangers and, at 
a later stage, also people one has 
difficulties with. Ultimately, this 
practice aims at cultivating feelings 
of benevolence towards all human 
beings. 
Using this kind of training, 
researchers around Barbara 
Fredrickson have shown that several 
weeks of regular compassion training 
can have a beneficial impact on self-
reported feelings of positive affect, 
personal resources, and well-being 
during everyday life. Interestingly, 
the beneficial effects of compassion 
training are not limited to the person 
who is training, but can also benefit 
others. More recent research in our 
lab has shown that participants 
who undergo loving kindness and 
compassion training increased their 
helping rates towards strangers in 
a computer game when compared 
to an active memory control group. 
Interestingly, the amount of time 
participants practiced compassion 
predicted how much a certain type of 
helping behavior increased, namely pure altruistic helping as opposed 
to reciprocity-based helping. This 
indicates that compassion training 
especially increases prosocial 
motivation rather than just norm-
adherence.
A neuroscientific perspective on 
empathy
This purely behavioral psychological 
research is more and more supported 
and extended by recent findings from 
social neuroscience. Some years 
ago, this relatively new discipline 
embarked on the investigation of 
social emotions such as empathy 
and compassion and their plasticity. 
A multitude of neuroimaging 
studies using functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) has, for 
example, shown that empathizing 
with another person’s feelings relies 
on the activation of neural networks 
that also support the first-person 
experience of these feelings. 
A very prominent way to study 
such ‘shared neuronal networks’ 
underlying empathic experiences 
is the domain of pain. In such 
‘empathy for pain paradigms’, 
scanned participants typically either 
receive painful stimulation to body 
parts themselves or are presented 
with pictures or cues that indicate 
that another person is currently 
experiencing pain. By then comparing 
the brain activations that are elicited 
by the first-hand experience of pain 
with those purely elicited by the 
vicarious observation of another 
person in pain, researchers have repeatedly found evidence for the 
existence of such shared neuronal 
networks (Figure 2). For example, 
meta-analyses on empathy for pain 
studies have revealed that a portion 
of the anterior insula and a specific 
part of the anterior cingulate cortex 
were consistently activated, both 
during the experience of pain as well 
as when vicariously feeling with the 
suffering of others.
Importantly, the magnitude of these 
empathy-related activations was 
modulated by individual differences 
in the degree to which participants 
reported having experienced negative 
feelings while empathizing with the 
other. Although empathy has been 
studied most extensively in the 
domain of pain, similar paradigms 
have also been used for the study 
of touch, disgust, taste or social 
rewards. Depending on the emotion in 
question, such shared networks were 
observed in somatosensory cortex 
for vicarious neutral touch, medial 
orbitofrontal cortex for vicarious 
pleasant touch, ventral striatum for 
shared social rewards and parts of the 
anterior insula when empathizing with 
taste and disgust. 
After having established this basic 
neural mechanism underlying our 
ability to share feelings with others, 
a second generation of empathy 
studies — again mostly focusing on 
vicarious pain — has investigated the 
modulation of such empathic brain 
responses by various factors. Indeed, 
the results reveal that empathic brain 
responses are modulated by factors 
that range from person-specific 
characteristics, such as gender, 
to context-specific factors. For 
example, in several fMRI studies in 
our lab we could show that perceived 
group membership or fairness of 
another person matters for how much 
empathy one will actually experience 
for the other. Thus, witnessing the 
suffering of a perceived in-group 
member (same football team) or 
of someone who played fairly in 
economic games beforehand evoked 
more pronounced empathy-related 
anterior insula activations than when 
witnessing an unfair person or an 
out-group member (rival football 
team) suffering pain. Importantly, the 
magnitude of the empathy-related 
signal in the anterior insula predicted 
the extent to which participants 
later engaged in altruistic helping 
behavior. 
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Figure 3. Differential neural networks for empathy and compassion.
(A) Training compassion or empathy leads to differential plasticity in neural networks. (B) Com-
passion training compared to memory training augments activations in ventral tegmental area/
substantia nigra (VTA/SN), medial orbitofrontal cortex (mOFC), and striatum, the latter span-
ning globus pallidus (GP) and putamen (Put). (C) Empathy training (in blue) leads to increased 
activations in anterior insula (AI) and anterior middle cingulate cortex (aMCC), while subse-
quent compassion training (in red) augments activations in medial orbitofrontal cortex (mOFC), 
subgenual anterior cingulate cortex (sgACC) and the ventral striatum/nucleus accumbens (VS, Plasticity of the socio-emotional 
brain
Despite existing psychological 
findings suggesting the possibility of 
transforming social emotions through 
training, it was only very recently that 
neuroscience began to investigate 
the neural plasticity underlying our 
capacity for empathy and compassion 
(Figure 3A). As usual in plasticity 
research, one begins with cross-
sectional studies which compare 
experts in a given field to novices. In 
the case of studying the malleability 
of the compassionate brain, the 
experts were long-term meditators 
that had trained compassion over 
many years. The results of a study 
conducted by Antoine Lutz and 
Richard Davidson revealed that 
when exposed to distressing sounds, 
expert meditators reveal increased 
activations in middle insula as 
compared to novice meditators. 
These studies were then followed 
by longitudinal designs in which 
meditation-naïve subjects underwent 
short-term training of affective 
capacities. 
In a series of studies performed 
in our lab, for example, the brains 
of meditation-naïve participants 
were scanned before and after 
they underwent either empathy or 
compassion training. During the 
scanning, participants were watching 
short film excerpts depicting others’ 
suffering. Throughout the experiment, 
participants provided self-reports 
on their feelings in response to each 
of these film clips. These studies 
revealed that, in comparison to a 
memory control group, short-term 
compassion training of several days 
was able to increase positive affect 
and activations in a neural network 
usually related to positive emotions 
(spanning medial orbitofrontal cortex 
and striatum; Figure 3B). This finding 
underlines the malleability of social 
emotions as it shows that a short-
term compassion training of several 
days can foster positive feelings and 
related brain activations, even when 
persons are exposed to the distress 
of others. 
Interestingly, this compassion-
related brain network differed from 
the above-mentioned networks 
implicated in empathy for pain 
(encompassing anterior insula and 
anterior middle cingulate cortex). In 
order to formally compare whether 
plasticity involved in empathy training differs from plasticity involved in 
compassion training, we conducted 
another longitudinal study in which 
participants first engaged in empathy 
training before receiving compassion 
training in a second step (Figure 3C). 
This study revealed that several 
days of empathy training led to an 
activation increase in insula and 
anterior middle cingulate cortex, 
as well as to an increase in self-
reported negative affect. In contrast, 
subsequent compassion training in 
the same participants could reverse 
this effect by decreasing negative 
affect and increasing positive 
NAcc). Original brain data in (B) and (C) adapteaffect. In line with previous results, 
compassion training again led to 
an increase in a non-overlapping 
brain network, including medial 
orbitofrontal cortex and ventral 
striatum (Figure 3C). The comparison 
of the effects of both training regimes 
on observed functional brain plasticity 
thus indicates that empathy and 
compassion training indeed elicited 
changes in differential brain networks 
associated with opposed patterns in 
experienced affect.
Taken together, these results 
underline the important distinction 
between empathy and compassion, 
d with permission from Klimecki et al. (2013).
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neurological level. Accordingly, 
exposure to the distress and suffering 
of others can lead to two different 
emotional reactions. Empathic 
distress, on the one hand, results in 
negative feelings and is associated 
with withdrawal. When experienced 
chronically, empathic distress most 
likely gives rise to negative health 
outcomes. On the other hand, 
compassionate responses are based 
on positive, other-oriented feelings 
and the activation of prosocial 
motivation and behavior. Given the 
potentially detrimental effects of 
empathic distress, the finding of 
existing plasticity of adaptive social 
emotions is encouraging, especially 
as compassion training not only 
promotes prosocial behavior, but 
also augments positive affect and 
resilience, which in turn fosters better 
coping with stressful situations. 
This opens up many opportunities 
for the targeted development of 
adaptive social emotions and 
motivation, which can be particularly 
beneficial for persons working in 
helping professions or in stressful 
environments in general.
Future outlook
Despite these recent advances in 
the neuroscientific study of social 
phenomena such as empathy and 
compassion and their plasticity, 
many questions remain to be 
answered. Currently, researchers are 
investigating the longer-term effects 
of different types of such socio-
affective training techniques, focusing 
not only on their effect on functional 
brain plasticity but also on changes 
in brain structure, health-related 
variables (stress hormones, immune 
parameters, neurogenetic markers) 
as well as ecologically valid everyday 
behavior and cognition (thoughts, 
prosocial actions, relationships to 
others).
Longitudinal follow-up studies will 
also have to determine how long 
such beneficial changes can be 
maintained and how these changes 
can be sustained. In addition, future 
research is needed to delineate 
in more detail the neurobiological 
mechanisms underlying the 
differential changes observed after 
empathy and compassion training. 
One such question relates to the 
neurotransmitters that are involved. 
And finally, future developmental neuroscience research may be able to 
determine critical periods throughout 
ontogeny which indicate when it is 
best to teach these socially relevant 
skills during development. Such 
knowledge could help to assure 
an effective education fostering 
subjective wellbeing, adaptive 
emotion-regulation, meaningful 
relationships and human prosociality.
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Cochlear implants are the first 
example of a neural prosthesis that 
can substitute a sensory organ: they 
bypass the malfunctioning auditory 
periphery of profoundly-deaf people 
to electrically stimulate their auditory 
nerve. The history of cochlear 
implants dates back to 1957, when 
Djourno and Eyriès managed, for the 
first time, to elicit sound sensations 
in a deaf listener using an electrode 
implanted in his inner ear. Since 
then, considerable technological 
and scientific advances have been 
made. Worldwide, more than 300,000 
deaf people have been fitted with a 
cochlear implant; it has become a 
standard clinical procedure for born-
deaf children and its success has 
led over the years to relaxed patient 
selection criteria; for example, it is 
now not uncommon to see people 
with significant residual hearing 
undergoing implantation. Although 
the ability to make sense of sounds 
varies widely among the implanted 
population, many cochlear implant 
listeners can use the telephone and 
follow auditory-only conversations in 
quiet environments. 
The core functions of a cochlear 
implant are to convert the input 
sounds into meaningful electrical 
stimulation patterns, and then to 
deliver these patterns to the auditory 
nerve fibers. In this primer, we shall 
describe how these two steps are 
performed, show how the original 
information present in the sounds is 
degraded as a result of both device 
and sensory limitations, and discuss 
current research trends aiming 
to improve speech perception, 
particularly in challenging listening 
conditions.
Normal and impaired hearing
In normal hearing, sound pressure 
waves travel down the ear canal and 
cause the eardrum to vibrate. These 
vibrations are directly transmitted 
to the entrance of the cochlea by 
the small bones of the middle ear 
(Figure 1). The cochlea is responsible 
for transducing these mechanical 
vibrations into action potentials that 
will further propagate towards the 
brain and eventually elicit a sound 
